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Abstract 
 
We analyse the competitive effects of various contractual provisions in a 
situation where rival retailers make offers to a common manufacturer. In 
contrast to Marx and Shaffer (2007), who find that a strong retailer can use 
slotting allowances (that is, upfront payments from manufacturers) to 
exclude its weaker rival, we show that foreclosure is no longer inevitable 
once retailers' offers can be contingent on the relationship being exclusive 
or not. There then exist equilibria that sustain the industry monopoly 
outcome; moreover, as long as retailers can use non-linear tariffs, such 
equilibria exist irrespectively of whether slotting allowances are allowed 
or banned. Non-contingent contracts, on the other hand, necessarily lead to 
exclusion, with or without slotting allowances. A ban on slotting allowances 
may therefore prove ineffective, while a ban on exclusive dealing options in 
supply contracts leads to foreclosure. (JEL: L14, L42) 
